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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DDI

Noted by DB/I

~~DEC 3 1955~~

DATE:

3 Dec

FROM :

LKT

SUBJECT:

Bob: I have included two
par 4's. I prefer the first
but use your own judgment

LKT. (Gen. Truscott)

D R A F T

2 December 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable Harold E. Stassen
Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament

SUBJECT : Progress Report on Proposed Policy of the United
States on the Question of Disarmament

REFERENCES : NIE 11-11-55
NIE 100-5-55

1. The Progress Report does not present the details of the proposed Armament Inspection Plan in sufficient detail to permit me to pass firm judgment upon it as an effective instrument for the implementation of NSC Action 1419. Moreover, my primary concern is with the ~~features of~~ ^{as it} the plan ~~which~~ may involve the collection, evaluation and dissemination of national intelligence. In that regard, I do have a heavy responsibility under existing laws and various NSC Directives and Executive Orders. As you are aware, I am extremely cognizant of the short-comings in intelligence pertaining to the USSR and the Soviet Orbit and particularly the intelligence affecting Orbit capabilities for adversely affecting the security and national policies of the United States. I have therefore a very vital interest in any inspection and verification system, since any such system will be of enormous value in the field of intelligence as applied to national security and national policies. While the information contained in the Progress Report is not sufficiently complete to warrant detailed critical analysis, I believe that the broad outline presented does afford a basis for some comments from an intelligence standpoint which may be worthy of consideration.

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Memo
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- 2 -

2. For convenience of reference, I will address my remarks under four principal general headings and follow with some specific comments and recommendations. The four principal general headings are:

- a. The intelligence implications of the proposed arms inspection system;
- b. The effectiveness of the system for achieving its objectives, particularly in providing "against the possibility of great surprise attack";
- c. The probable acceptability of the proposed plan to the USSR;
- d. The probable value of the plan, if rejected by the USSR, in aiding to retain the initiative in the propaganda campaign around the problem of disarmament.*

3. Intelligence Implications

I assume that information to be disclosed in the "blue prints" would be substantially complete information concerning national military establishments and as much of the industrial and economic assets as would be necessary to determine war-making potential and particularly any future build-up for possible attack. I would also assume that these disclosures would be made in successive stages as may be agreed upon, and each stage fully verified before proceeding with the next; and that the inspection and verification posts and teams located within the country would be situated so that verification and inspection would be possible and that inspection personnel would have necessary freedom of movement and freedom from interference to permit access to installations, units, and objects to be inspected and verified. In such case, an inspection

* References herein to disarmament should be taken as referring to reductions in or limits on armaments.

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Approved For Release 2003/01/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R004200110015-0

- 3 -

organization of the scope outlined, together with the aerial reconnaissance and inspection which was inherent in the President's proposals and indicated in the Proposed Report, would certainly have the capability for producing a vast amount of intelligence. This information when properly processed would doubtless answer most of the questions concerning the Orbit which now torment the intelligence community, and it would go far to meet requirements from the intelligence point of view as regards national security and national policy with regard to the Orbit.

It seems hardly necessary to point out that the objects to be inspected, the objectives of inspection, the rights of access, limitations or restrictions upon such rights, the means of verification, and the extent and reliability of communications provided for the inspectors will need to be spelled out in great detail before effectiveness of any plan can be judged and before it can provide any basis for serious negotiation.

Such a system would result in the accumulation of a vast amount of data which would be meaningless in raw form. It is to be presumed that the organization contemplated will provide for an evaluating function in the successive echelons. While the Proposed Report indicates that the Department of Defense would be the executive agent for carrying out any inspection plan, it should be clearly recognized that the resulting intelligence ^{would} ^{constitute} ^{mere} ~~should not constitute~~ departmental intelligence, but would also involve national intelligence for which the Central Intelligence Agency under law has a primary responsibility. This ^{intelligence analysis} ~~necessary~~ support for the inspection system would have to be carefully planned in advance.

Approved For Release 2003/01/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R004200110015-0

- 4 -

Moreover there will be an obvious need to supplement and check overtly obtained data by a comprehensive all-source intelligence effort, the planning and implementation of which must be carefully phased with that of the Disarmament Plan itself.

While no specific provision refers to Communist China, it is my opinion that Communist China and other Communist-controlled areas will have to be considered as being within the Orbit and would have to be included in the area of inspection eventually.

In summary, because the USSR now has vastly greater information concerning the U.S. than we possess concerning the USSR, the net gain from verified disclosure would be overwhelmingly on the side of the U.S., unless the system required the U.S. to make disclosures of advanced weapons types and weapon production processes which the USSR does not now possess. In short, the U.S. would for the first time come into possession of a really adequate foundation for its intelligence on the USSR, and the USSR would achieve at best a marginal improvement in its intelligence on the U.S.

4. Advantage to the Soviets

I am mindful of the fact that one of the great dangers that confronts this country is that an inspection system might eliminate uncertainty in the mind of an aggressor. It is this uncertainty which is perhaps the major deterrent to the initiation of large scale hostilities. If an aggressor, as a result of inspection of our retaliatory and defense forces could determine that an initial attack would prevent effective retaliation, then the object of the inspection plan would be defeated.

Any inspection system will place large numbers of Communist personnel within the United States with access to defense and industrial

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Approved For Release 2003/01/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R004200110015-0

- 5 -

installations with consequent grave danger to the security of the United States through intelligence, subversion and sabotage. This factor will have to be given most serious consideration and taken into account in any inspection system devised.

~~ALTERNATE~~

4. Advantages to Soviets

Despite the over-all quantitative advantage in terms of improving intelligence on the potential enemy that the U.S. would derive from the proposed inspection plan, there would be significant gains to the Soviet Union. Its intelligence on disposition, state of readiness, and capabilities of our key offensive and defensive forces would be rendered ~~infinitely~~ ^{much} more precise than under present circumstances and ~~could~~ ^{could} be kept current on a daily basis. Particular vulnerabilities might well be exposed, and the element of doubt as to the degree of success of any attack they might contemplate would be substantially reduced. *insert A p. 4*

It must, moreover, be recognized that the thousands of Soviet inspectors who would be admitted to the U.S. and its overseas bases under the plan would ~~be~~ ^{include many} trained for and charged with clandestine missions over and above their ostensible duties. This would not only greatly enhance their capabilities for espionage against areas and installations excluded from inspection but would also provide significant opportunities for subversive activities of all sorts, ~~to and including the clandestine introduction and placement of mass destruction weapons.~~

Though the responsibilities for measures to detect and minimize these dangers lie in the security forces of the Departments of Justice and Defense, reference to them as part of an over-all intelligence evaluation seems appropriate.

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SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/01/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R004200110015-0

- 6 -

5. Effectiveness, Especially Against Surprise

With regard to protection against surprise attack, I am of the opinion that an inspection system on the scale outlined, if it provided for continuous observation of delivery vehicles and their current production, and of essential Soviet military installations and also for continuous reliable communications, would effectively ^{eliminate the} ~~prevent~~ surprise ^{element of an} attack given present Soviet capabilities. I am of the opinion that future assurance against nuclear surprise attack can be obtained only if there is an actual denial, through arms limitation and reduction, of the capability to attack without noticeable preparations. Such assurance against surprise nuclear attack can be obtained only if provisions for progressive arms reduction and limitation, along with a sound and comprehensive inspection system, were made an integral part of a disarmament program.

6. Probable Acceptability to the USSR

I am of the opinion that it can be predicted almost with complete certainty that the system outlined in the Proposed Report is not one which could win agreement from the USSR. Faced with a prospect of 20,000 to 30,000 Western personnel within their country, the Soviet leaders would hesitate to expose their closed society to such extensive external influences for fear that such alien influences could compromise their traditional effort to hold Soviet society in isolation from the Western world. Soviet leaders rightly or wrongly would also tend to regard any inspection system which did not provide for the immediate dismantling of the presently superior U.S. nuclear power as one which would ^{tend to} freeze the present situation ~~into~~ into one of permanent inferiority for them. Further,

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- 7 -

the Communists regard themselves as being involved in permanent conflict with the West. In this contest they are ~~never~~^{un}likely to deny themselves, to the extent that this plan would seem to do, the option of employing whatever means, including force or the threat of force, which may seem desirable to them at any time. I am of the opinion that the Soviet leaders desire to avoid a nuclear war with the U.S., but there is little doubt that they consider themselves able to avoid such a war without making what they would almost certainly consider to be unnecessary sacrifices.

7. Probable Value of Plan in Aiding Retention of Initiative in Propaganda

On the whole, I believe that the plan if carefully and effectively presented to world opinion would be acknowledged as a sincere effort to advance the chances of a durable peace. It is an elaboration of the President's Summit Proposals, the reception of which in world opinion was generally favorable.

There are some omissions which will make the plan vulnerable to Soviet counter-propaganda. For example, the minimal emphasis upon arms reduction would constitute one. Impact would be much stronger on world opinion if, while insisting upon an effective inspection system, the U.S. was able to commit itself in principle to substantial arms reduction on a reciprocal basis once an effective inspection system were in force and the successive "blue prints" verified satisfactorily.

This point is of particular importance because the scale of the proposed inspection system is likely to come as something of a surprise to world opinion. There is some danger that the U.S. may be

charged with setting impossible requirements in order to torpedo reduction of armament negotiations once and for all. This factor would indicate the desirability for careful analysis to insure that the scale of the system is actually the minimum required to accomplish the objectives.

Soviet counter-propaganda will of course stress the failure to mention control over nuclear weapons other than in connection with a proposal to place future production of fissionable material under international control. The fear of nuclear weapons is basic in the preoccupation of the world opinion with the disarmament issue. To counter this attack, it would be necessary to make a major information effort to establish the fact that no reliable inspection and control can be applied to nuclear weapons themselves since there are no reliable techniques to account for past production.

8. Specific Comments

a. With reference to Section III of the Proposed Report, the principle that the degree of dispersal of U.S. facilities would determine the scale necessary for a successful initial attack and therefore that greater dispersal would compel the enemy to launch a larger attack and therefore increase the likelihood of advance detection by inspections seems sound. I would assume that any inspection plan contemplated should insure maintaining alert and dispersed retaliatory and defensive forces at least until the actual execution of an inspection system has established a basis for mutual confidence among nations, possibly in some distant and remote future.) Whether present dispersal of U.S. retaliatory capability is sufficient in the light of the proposed inspection system is a technical question upon which

- 9 -

b. With reference to Section IV of the Proposed Report, the statement that the USSR is likely to have a ICBM within ten years is in accord with current estimates. This subject is currently under review but any change in the estimated date of this weapons availability will make it earlier rather than later. I agree with the statement that the ICBM could not be ready in quantity without detection by the proposed inspection system.

c. I have noted the opinion expressed in Section V, Paragraph A, "the outlook for future decades includes increasingly great danger of a nuclear war". Our estimates have emphasized that despite prospective increases in Soviet nuclear capabilities, U.S. retaliatory capability if maintained will continue to have a deterrent effect, and that the USSR under these circumstances will continue to try to avoid substantial risks of general war. This situation might change if the USSR achieved a major technological break-through.

d. With reference to Section VI, all available intelligence indicates that there is a further important objective for U.S. policy which should be included in any disarmament plan. This is that U.S. policy ought to be calculated to maintain solidarity of U.S. alliances. Thus far the Soviet line on disarmament has aimed to sow dissension between the U. S. and its partners. For the present, therefore, disarmament for the Soviets is more important as a field of political warfare maneuvering than as a subject of serious negotiation. U.S. policy should take this into account. I suggest the objective might be stated about as follows:

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Approved For Release 2003/01/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R004200110015-0

- 10 -

To handle the disarmament issue in such fashion as to insure substantial unity with the principal Allies of the U.S. and to obtain maximum support of free world opinion.

e. With reference to Paragraphs B 3 and 5 of Section VI, by all odds the most important feature which the UK, French and Soviet proposals have in common is the provision for reduction to agreed force levels. Under the proposed policy, the U.S. will accept only modest initial reductions and will only contemplate important reductions at a later stage. By leaving obscure our intentions with regard to reduction, I believe^{we}/are vulnerable to the USSR driving a wedge between the U.S. and its Allies and probably our domestic public. This factor underlines the importance of early determination of a complete U.S. policy with respect to armament reduction and limitation.

9. Conclusions

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the importance of national intelligence with regard to national security and national policy and to underscore the important relationship which any inspection system will necessarily have in connection with the collection, evaluation and dissemination of information upon which national intelligence is based. I want to assure you that the Central Intelligence Agency is ready at all times to render the maximum assistance in developing what will necessarily be in effect an overt intelligence system in which nations operate on a reciprocal and legalized basis.

Approved For Release 2003/01/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R004200110015-0

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Bob:

I have marked up General T's draft, which seems generally excellent and corrects the tone of the ONE paper particularly.

Aside from your point re 7 c., I have one strong disagreement on the sweeping stated reasons for Soviet rejection, p. 5.

Only one ONE point if omitted entirely, this being the mention of the dubious usefulness of economic indicators. Probably we cannot get into the allocation of ^{suspect} effort in these comments, but it would be interesting to query General T. to see if undue numbers were put to watching infantry battalions and steel mills. If the 20-30,000 is too generous, that affects one reason for Soviet rejection, tho not the others.

~~add~~ General T. cuts out all reference to the NIE. I should think footnote refs would be good, just to show where we are speaking for the community.

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Approved For Release 2003/01/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R004200110015-0

Bottom of Page 3

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Approved For Release 2003/01/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R004200110015-0